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Abstract
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
This study objective is to investigate the influence of board characteristics and audit committee 
characteristics on accounting conservatism with respect to the influence of family ownership in 
Turkey. The findings explained that clients’ demand for accounting conservatism improved 
because of board characteristics (e.g. board size, independence & women on board) and the audit 
committee characteristics (e.g. audit committee independence and audit committee expertise).  
Hence, the family ownership undermines the impact of board characteristics and the audit 
committee characteristics to demand accounting conservatism, which will be unfavorable 
outcome for the minority shareholders. Thus, this study suggests that regulators should increase 
law enforcement to improve corporate governance in Turkey to accommodate the unique 
characteristics of family ownership and offer a protected environment for minority shareholders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Accounting conservatism represents one of 
the significant features of the quality of financial 
information. Conservatism is subjective in nature, 
and it is involved in most of accounting conceptual 
frameworks. Numerous studies have examined 
accounting conservatism in different financial and 
economic environments (Basu, 1997). In general, 
these studies focus on viewing conservatism as a 
practice of asymmetric recognition in which 
emphases on accounting norms with highest 
liabilities/expenses of lowest assets/revenues. 
Conservatism accounting could be affected by 
features of each environment such as the set of 
accounting standards adopted in the country. For 
instance, Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) revealed that 
accounting results of firms in countries with code 
law systems are less conservative than those of 
firms in common law legal systems. Recently, 
although some studies have argued that family 
ownership is associated with higher earnings 
quality and firm performance (Ali, Chen, & 
Radhakrishnan, 2007) accounting conservatism 
has become an important issue for family-
controlled firms. Family firms certainly have less 
serious agency problems because of their reduced 
separation of ownership and management; 
however, they do have more serious agency 
problems between the controlling family and 
minority shareholders (type-II agency problem). 
Corporate governance mechanisms have received 
substantial scholarly attention as a way to enhance 
accounting conservatism. There are a considerable 
number of studies (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007) 
which document that the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms affect accounting 
conservatism practices of widely held public firms, 
however there are relatively less studies (Ren, 
2014) which investigates whether the measures of 
corporate governance have the same effect on the 
level of accounting conservatism when ownership 
is not widely dispersed, and in particular when 
ownership is concentrated in the hands of families. 
This study contributes to the existing research by 
searching whether family ownership moderates 
the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms in enhancing the level of accounting 
conservatism practices on a sample of Turkish 
firms. Turkey has an ideal setting to handle issues 
related to accounting conservatism in family firms 
due to the presence of large number of family firms 
(Mustafa, Che-Ahmad, & Chandren, 2018).  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
According to the positive accounting theory 
accounting conservatism can be exercised to 
control earnings management and reduce agency 
conflicts (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Accounting 
conservatism is one of the corporate governance 
mechanisms. That is due to its role in restricting 
the opportunistic behaviours of managers (Basu, 
1997). Due to the benefits of accounting 
conservatism, firms with strong corporate 
governance are more likely to adopt high levels of 
conservatism practices. Corporate governance is an 
interrelated system; in a particular arrangement 
some practises of corporate governance 
mechanisms are more effective, leading to various 
patterns of corporate governance. In this regards, 
this study applies a contingent approach to 
investigate how family-owned firms influence 
board strategic behaviours in terms of adopting the 
levels of accounting conservatism. According to 
agency theory, internal corporate governance 
mechanisms such as board of directors and audit 
committee (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007) represent 
significant corporate governance mechanisms to 
limit the agency conflicts through improving the 
quality of reported earnings. This study is 
concentrating on family-owned businesses not only 
influence board incentives to monitor 
management, but also on board’s ability to demand 
accounting conservatism. The importance of 
clients’ incentive is addressed by agency theory 
while, the importance of clients’ ability to demand 
accounting conservatism is derived from resource 
dependency theory (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
Based on the above arguments, these study 
hypotheses are:  
H1: There is a relationship between board size and 
accounting conservatism. 
H2: There is a relationship between board independence 
and accounting conservatism. 
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H3: There is a relationship between women on board and 
accounting conservatism. 
H4: There is a relationship between audit committee 
independence and accounting conservatism. 
H5: There is a relationship between audit committee 
expertise and accounting conservatism. 
H6: There is a relationship between family ownership 
and accounting conservatism. 
H7: Family ownership moderates the relationship 
between board size and accounting conservatism. 
H8: Family ownership moderates the relationship 
between board independence and accounting 
conservatism. 
H9: Family ownership moderates the relationship 
between women on board and accounting 
conservatism. 
H10: Family ownership moderates the relationship 
between audit committee independence and 
accounting conservatism. 
H11: Family ownership moderates the relationship 
between audit committee expertise and 
accounting conservatism. 
 
METHODS 
 
Turkish firms have been used as a 
population of this study. Financial institutions are 
excluded from the sample because they apply 
different principles of corporate governance 
(Zulkarnain, 2009). This study covers the five-year 
period starting from 2011 to 2015. The empirical 
analysis based on data collected from firms’ annual 
reports, complemented by DataStream. 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
Table 5 shows that there is a negative 
relationship between BSIZE and ACCR at the rate of 
0.081. Agency theory suggests that large corporate 
boards encourages directors’ domination and leads 
to complicate the process of decision making 
(Jensen, 1993). Hence, hypothesis H1 is supported. 
 
Table 5. Accounting Conservatism Regression Models 
Items 
Model1 Model2(IVs*FOWN) 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
BSIZE -0.081 -2.39** -0.061 -1.79* 
BID -0.098 1.13 0.157 1.84* 
WOB 0.170 2.62** 0.185 2.95** 
ACCI -0.062 -0.61 -0.125 -1.27 
ACCEX 0.297 4.55*** 0.276 4.33*** 
SOTI 0.452 4.11*** 0.416 3.79*** 
BSIZE*FOWN - - -0.035 -0.53 
BID*FOWN - - 0.009 0.12 
WOB*FOWN - - -0.223 -4.47*** 
ACCI*FOWN - - 0.028 0.42 
ACCEX*FOWN - - -0.169 -3.42** 
FSIZE -0.095 -3.37** -0.088 -3.17** 
LEVE 2.790 2.17** 1.720 1.36 
FAGE 0.007 2.65** 0.007 2.84** 
Wald Chi 2 105.88  173.05  
Prob<chi2 0.000  0.000  
Notes: * = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5% and *** = significant at 1%.   
  
The influence of BID on ACCR is positive but 
not significant. Its effect is about 0.98%. The 
implication of this finding is that for every increase 
in BID by one unit, ACCR would rise by 0.98%. The 
finding consistent with that of (Ren, 2014). Family 
related directors as independent directors satisfy 
the definitions set by the regulators, but these 
families related who represent them are not truly 
independent. Hence, hypothesis H2 is rejected. 
WOB has positive influence on ACCR to the tune of 
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17%. This implies that for every single increase in 
WOB, the influence on the ACCR increase by 17% 
this align with that of (Abdullah & Ku Ismail, 
2013). A 62% medium relationship exists between 
ACCI and ACCR. This relationship which is also a 
direct relationship shows that the more 
independent the audit committee, the lower the 
chances of selecting a high ACCR even though this 
relationship is insignificant (-0.61). this study 
result align with the result of Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2008). Thus, hypothesis H4 is 
rejected. The finding displays that ACCEX have a 
29% influence on ACCR. A study by Sultana and 
Mitchell (2015) show positive association between 
accounting and financial expertise of audit 
committee members and ACCR. Hence, hypothesis 
H5 is accepted. Family ownership has a positive 
contribution to the accruals (t= 4.11). Family 
owners are less likely to evolve in earning 
manipulation and this align with the result of (Ball, 
Robin, & Wu, 2003). Therefore, hypothesis H6 is 
accepted. The influence of BSIZE on ACCR turns 
insignificant with the introduction of the FOWN (t 
= -0.53). Consistently, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
argued that large board of directors complicates 
decision making process as a consequence of tasks 
coordination problems. Thus, hypothesis H7 is 
rejected. Nevertheless, like the direct relationship 
that displays an insignificant negative relationship 
of about -0.98%, the moderated relationship gives 
a positive influence of about 0.09%. The 
insignificance of the moderating effect of BID is a 
concept deprived of its actual meaning. Firms 
nominate directors that fulfil the legal definition of 
independence but are close to the management and 
act in the interest of the controlling shareholders. 
The finding does not support Hypothesis H8. WOB 
show a significant (t = -4.47) impact on ACCR with 
the introducing FOWN. The most interesting is that 
the moderating influence of FOWN on WOB leads 
to a negative relationship. The same opinion is 
reported by Wu et al. (2016). Hence, hypothesis H9 
is accepted. There is insignificant relationship 
between ACCI and ACCR in the presence of FOWN. 
However, the result is consistent with Krishnan 
and Visvsnsthsn (2008). The result doesn't support 
Hypothesis H10. Expertise directors have an 
adverse influence on ACCR in the presence of 
FOWN (t = -3.42). Directors occupy a position in 
the audit committee might have low incentive to 
depend on ACCR in their monitoring role, because 
lawsuits against directors are much less common 
as a consequence of weak institutional setting such 
as Turkey compared to the United States (Fanto, 
1998). The finding supports Hypothesis H11.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study finding align with that of previous 
evidences that board characteristics and audit 
committee characteristics mitigate Type II Agency 
Problem through adopting high accounting 
conservatism. This study validates that family 
ownership undermines boards demand for 
accounting conservatism, a result which will be 
unfavourable to minority shareholders. To sum up, 
this paper contributes to providing a general 
understanding about board behaviour in engaging 
in monitoring function using accounting 
conservatism. Based on the aforementioned, it is 
worth for more empirical studies on corporate 
governance, accounting conservatism and family-
owned firms in Turkey.  
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